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INTRODUCTION power into thermal power in the firing pin of
the gun. The chain continues as thermalN aval Gunfire Support (NGFS) is a critical power until the round propellent is exploded.
capability of the U. S. Navy, and is used Hereafter, the power is mechanical - the pro- M anaging
to protect amphibious forces. Often, the jectile is catapulting toward the target.
execution of NGFS is time-critical. The accu- As the projectile nears the target, its deto-
racy of the shooting (called fall-of-shot) and nation sequence takes place. This sequence is Ship
the time it takes the gun crew to shoot the gun started by the fuze in the nose of the projectile.
(called the gun cycle time), are two critical The fuze can be mechanically timed, point Perform ance
attributes of a mission. If the rounds land on detonating, or work based on the proximity of
or near the target, and if the gun crew can fire the earth. Fusing is determined by the round of Naval
the gun quickly, the NGFS mission is most type and the nature of the target. Once the
likely to be successful. detonation is witnessed by spotters near the Gunfire
Both of these performance characteristics target, an aimpoint correction vector is calcu-
vary from ship to ship, crew to crew, and mis- lated. This vector is relayed to the gun crew Support
sion to mission. There is both bias and vari- through the command, control, and commu-
ability in the characteristics, and one or both nications network. U
can suffer when some component of the gun The ship has been underway during the Uing
system deteriorates. There is immediate feed- flight of the round, the construction of the
back within the system in that the crew is con- spotting vector, and the communications. The Statistical
tinuously apprized of its fall-of-shot accuracy, gun crew uses a fire control computer and a
and any crew member can observe the gun radar or other navigational system to stabilize Process
cycle time. the old aimpoint, then corrects the aim of the
In this work, we develop a novel applica- gun based on the new spotting vector. Often Control
tion of statistical process control (SPC) to fall- the gun gets a second aimpoint change
of-shot, and to gun cycle times. We will show because of the nature of the target. At this
how control charting can be used during the point, the process starts over again. Michael Bailey
execution of an NGFS mission, as well as dur- Statistical process control is a set of tech- Associate Professor
ing NGFS training to increase the efficiency of niques used in managing a noisy system we Department of Operations
the gun crew and to save costly ammunition wish to keep stationary in mean and variabil- Research
and range time. ity. These techniques have been used widely Naval Postgraduate School
The purpose of this work is in managing machinery in factories. The goal Monterey, California 93943
of many SPC techniques is to provide an auto-
* to describe how SPC techniques can be matic method for detecting drastic deteriora- John Bowden
effectively used to manage NGFS process- tion of the performance of the equipment, Operations Branch Manager
es; where performance is measured via a set of Crane Division, Naval
" to discuss the practical hurdles in applying key performance characteristics. Control Surface Warfare Center
SPC to data coming from NGFS qualifica- charts are simple devices used to establish 
Crae Warfan
tion exercises; bounds on measured characteristics, so that 
Crane, Indiana
to discuss how the use of the results of SPC when the bounds are exceeded, production Alexander J. Callahan
ton pshould be suspended and the machine in Senior Engineer
agement of these platforms and the assets question should be adjusted or repaired. COMARCOtheyexend in thesematormsnandethnsst In what follows, we show how SPC tech- Bloomfield, Indiana
they expend in maintaining readiness. niques can be used to manage the gun crew's
execution of the mission. In particular, we will
THE PROCESS use control charts to examine the performanceof gun systems, where the attributes mea-
The process of executing an NGFS mission sured will be cycle time and miss distance.
has as its kernel the process of firing a single
round accurately. Starting in the gun maga-
zine, where the rounds are kept, a round is METHODOLOGY
retrieved and placed in an automatic loader.
The loader system delivers the round to the In this section, we describe the data we will
gun chamber, and the system starts its elec- use to control our process as well as the
tronic firing sequence. The sequence is analo- sequence of steps we employed to character-
gous to a series of links in a chain which ize the behavior of the NGFS target process-
ultimately ends in the conversion of electrical ing system.
Military Operations Research, Summer 1994 Page 5
MANAGING SHIP PERFORMANCE
The Data ance from the spotters. Spotting for area targets is
significantly different and less demanding than for
The data we used came from ship exercises per- point targets. Hence, the data associated with each
formed at Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility round fired may come from one of four situations
(AFWTF), Isle de Vieques, Puerto Rico. We collect- - spotting point targets, spotting area targets, fir-
ed data from three (3) different ships, one of which ing for effect on point targets, and firing for effect
we saw for two qualification exercises separated by on area targets.
twelve (12) months. The other ships were moni- The upshot of the preceding discussion is that
tored for only one qualification exercise. Hence, the system we described above is only fully real-
we have four observation sets. We recorded the ized during spotting for point targets. Point target
data at the AFWTF observation post, where the spotting rounds are the most complicated to deliv-
exercises are managed. er and involve all of the components of the NGFS
The exercises are made up of a collection of process. Only a small portion of the data collected
engagements designed to be challenging, as well as were spotting rounds for point targets. The data
representative of the different NGFS missions that we analyzed for miss distances included only these
a ship might be asked to perform in battle. The rounds, while we were able to accept cycle times
exercises are performed by the ships in a controlled from point target spotting rounds as well as some
environment where their execution can be of the area target spotting rounds. As we will see,
observed in detail, and are scored based on the this makes each one-exercise data set too small to
overall performance of the ship. The ships' crews use in off-the-shelf control charts.
carry these scores as credentials, so the crews are The U. S. Navy developed and maintains a set of
very motivated to perform well. threat lists for different warfare areas, including
The exercises involve area and point targets. NGFS. The NGFS warplan establishes require-
Each target undergoes a spotting evolution fol- ments that ships performing NGFS be able to
lowed by a fire-for-effect evolution. In the spotting destroy or disable a specified set of targets in a
evolution the gun system is expected to locate the specified time interval. These war plans are used
target and fire a round at it. The round's impact is to develop exercises for NGFS qualification, and
witnessed by spotters and the gun's aimpoint is can be used to develop thresholds for miss distance
adjusted. After the spotters are satisfied that the and cycle times. As the usual manufacturing appli-
gun can reliably hit the target, the fire-for-effect cation has a specification for workstation perfor-
evolution begins. During the fire-for-effect, the gun mance, NGFS platforms have threshold cycle times
fires a salvo of many rounds with no further guid- and miss distances which are derived from the U.
S. Navy war plan for NGFS. Evolving capabilities
of NGFS platforms are taken into account when the
war plan is formulated, thus the goals set out in the
SHIP CHARACTERISTIC TOTAL OK AFTER war plan are consistent with the ships' process's
ROUNDS OBS FILTER capabilities.
1 cycle time 72 34 32 We recorded two characteristics - cycle times
1 miss distance 72 26 24 and miss distances. We wish to know:
2 (1st) cycle time 82 25 24
2 (1st) miss distance 82 24 24 e Is the time between rounds in control?
2 (2nd) cycle time 48 28 28 * If in control, is the time between rounds low
2 (2nd) miss distance 48 14 14 enough or should the war plan requirements be
3 cycle time 115 65 60 altered to reflect realities seen in the charts?
3 miss distance 115 52 52
I Is the miss distance for each gun in control?
Table 1: Samples for the different characteristics for the e If in control, is the miss distance for each gun
different ships. OK OBSs were rounds which we con- low enough, or should the war plan require-
sidered to come from the same distribution as the char- ments be altered to reflect realities seen in the
acteristic we sought. The filter mentioned was for charts?
outliers
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utable causes were for shots fired at down-slope
CY targets. These target geometries amplify usually
o small miss distances for the same reason that a




As mentioned above, we employed the short pro-
S2(1 St) duction run SPC techniques as provided in the sta-
tistical package MIN1TAB [8]. We employed the
Figure 1: A boxplot for the first exercise cycle times of short-run moving average (MA) chart and the
ship 2. Two outliers were identified for removal, moving range (MR) charts.
A prototypical control charting technique starts
with the data X1, X2,..., X.. We group the data into
groups G1, G2,..., G, each group being of size m.
A Priori Identification of Outliers We then take some measurement for each group
Gi, eg. the range in disjoint groups G, G2,...,GgBecause we were the data collectors during the
exercises, we were privileged to listen to ship-to-
shore communications. We took notes during the Ri = max xeGi X -min Xeci X.
exercises with an eye toward identifying data
points which were outstandingly bad, and where
there existed known attributable causes for this We establish upper (lower) control limit UCL(LCL)
badness. Due to the nature of the operation, some
parts of the process, usually hardware failures,
would cause large delays in the delivery of rounds UCL = R+36R;
or cause rounds with large miss distances. These
conditions are regularly regarded as failures by all
concerned, and are treated by repairing the system. LCL = R+ 3 8R
We wished to exclude these data from consider-
ation because we wished to know if the system was We diagnose the system using a plot of the series Ri
in control when the crew thought the system was along with the control limits. The system is defi-
operational. Many such data were not recorded, nitely out of control if the control limits are exceed-
but some points found their way into our data. For ed. Other diagnostics can also raise alarms, eg. a
each data set, we constructed a simple boxplot [4] long series of points which are all increasing or
and possible outliers were identified, see figure 1. decreasing. The control chart we used here as an
The historical account was then referenced to example is called an R chart, and tells whether the
determine if an attributable cause existed to variability in the data is consistent throughout.
remove the data point. Small sample control charts typically use small
Each data set was filtered for outliers with overlapping groups. MA computes the moving
attributable causes. The result was that several averages of the groups using a specified window
points were removed from the cycle time data, width w, and uses the moving range as a surrogate
while only two points were removed from the miss for the population standard deviation to produce
distance data. This was because causes for most control limits. Let Gi = {X{(i-l)w + 11, X{(i-1)w +
large miss distances often involve gun system 2},..., X{(i)w}}, then
alignment, and only examination of the gun system
itself could confirm misalignment. Furthermore,
any misalignment would persist throughout the I XeG, X;
exercise, so that the resulting large miss distances MAE-=
were not outliers, but consistent. Our only attrib- g
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MRi = max XeG, X - min X , X. practices, the ship continued to shoot its qualifica-
tion missions, used a large number of expensive
Our small sample MA chart has control limits rounds of ammunition, and received a low score
given by: quality control. This chart is: for its qualification for NGFS. Clearly, no one ben-
efits from such an experience.
UCL = lA+AIMR;
LCL = lA+AMR. Table 2: Preliminary control charting results.
A, is gotten from tables in sources like [1], or any SHIP CHARACTERISTIC MA N MR IN
text on quality control. This chart is reputed to CONTROL CONTROL
have increased sensitivity as compared with other 1 cycle time Y Y
short-rim charts, and serves the same purpose - to 1 _ _ distance Y Y
identify when the measure of central tendency 2(1st) cycle time Y Y
goes out of control [3]. 2(1st) miss distance Y N
2(2nd) cycle time Y N
MR charts are used to track the variation of the 2(2nd) miss distance N N
data. When the process is seen to be out-of-control 3 cycle time Y N
using MR, the process is displaying an unusually 3 miss distance N N
high variability. This can happen even when MA
is in control. The chart is formed using control lim-
its:
UCL= R+DMR, Consolidating Data: Historical and
5L= Md Intership Consolidation
LCL = MR+DMRMd. As noted, the sample sizes available from a single
exercise were too small for proper application of
where MRMd is the median value of MR, i = 1, 2,..., standard control charting techniques. Further-
g, and D, and D, are found in tables. As seen in fig- more, it is clearly desirable to give control limits to
ure 2, our cycle times for ship 3 remained in control ships before they arrive at the AFWTF range to
for MA but went out of control for MR. The assign- expend some expensive ammunition and range
able cause for the behavior we see here is that the time.
ship had intermittent visual contact with its navi- We were inclined to combine the data into a
gation reference point. Thus it was forced to hold single data set to use for all ships. However, we
its fire for short but significant periods of time dur- realized that the data sets came from different
ing some missions.
As a result of the analysis of the control charts
for the different ships, we were able to reach the
conclusions shown in table 2. From figure 2 we see 0
(othat the cycle times for ship 3 displayed large vari- ) o
ation {\it in its variability). The MR makes two 0-
sojourns outside the control limits. An I chart was > o * *'
also constructed for this case, and it showed one < ( \ .1 of 9
sojourn outside the control limits, as well as seven ._ 0 .M
consecutive decreasing points. These are both sig- o C
nals that assignable causes should be sought.
In the recommendations we form below, ship 3 o
should have left the firing line early in the qualifi- 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
cation process to examine the causes for these chart
behaviors. According to current management sample number






30 10 $2(30- 2(2)$6
sample number
Figure 2: MA and MR for ship 3's cycle time. Note thato
MA shows the central tendency in control, whidle MR 0
I. 0




ships and should be treated as data from differento
workstations in a manufacturing process. Even o-
when we observe the same ship more than once, S1 S2(1)32(2) S3
the interval between visits to the AFWTF range is
often more than one year. Hence, personnel on the
gun crew can be expected to partially change, the Figure 3: Boxplots for the miss distance and cycle timesgun crw canfor the four data sets.
spotting crew will certainly be different, and the
command of the ship may even change.
At issue - Can we combine many ships, or many
observations from the same ship, into a single sample to Figure 3 shows the boxplots of the data from the
establish control limits? This proposition can be four observation sets. Figure 4 shows the Q-Q plot
repackaged as the hypothesis that the ships' data for the analysis comparing Ship 1 and Ship 3 miss
comes from the same distribution, distances. The decisions in the table seem to be
We constructed boxplots, Q-Q plots, [4] and consistent with our intuition. The results strongly
Kolmogorov-Sminmov (KS) bounds [6] to guide us
in deciding if we could combine different group-
ings and provide more powerful control tech-
niques. Table 3 shows some of the results of our o
testing.
0
___ ___ __ ___ __ ___ __o 0r
combination combine
All cycle times Y o
All miss distances N
Ship 2 miss distance Y 0
0 20 40 60 80 120
Table 3: Results of graphical and nonparametric tests for miss1
amalgomating data from different ships and different
exercises from the same ship. Conclusion: combine all Figure 4: Q-Q plot for miss distances for Ship 1 and Ship
cycle times into a single data set, combine data from the 3. Clearly, these data come from different distributions.
same ship for miss distance for two observations.
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suggest that cycle times are similar for all vessels benchmark for performance that until now has not
considered. Cycle times are dependent mostly on existed. The control chart can be used to measure
crew performance - all of the crews are trained at performance in a training mode without shooting
a central facility in Norfolk, Virginia. However, the gun. Cycle times can be recorded while using
miss distance data for different guns should not be the computer simulation of the observation post
combined. Gun mounts, especially aging systems, while away from the range in order to ensure the
may have quirks which make their miss distance combat team is operating at an acceptable rate.
behavior unique. Furthermore, these conditions Such a man-in-the-loop simulation exists [7], and
are known to change over relatively short periods could be used by crews while in transit to the
of time. range. Using this simulation, large sets of low-cost
We combined the data as suggested in table 3. data can be collected on the crew performance.
We then proceeded with standard X-bar and R As the ship then moves to the range, the charts
charts for the collected cycle times, as well as for again can provide the feedback that the systems are
ship 2's miss distance data. The result of the cycle operating within specification. When deterioration
time data R chart is seen in figure 5. This R chart is detected, efforts can then be made immediately
showed the systems all in control - a conclusion to determine and correct the cause before a com-
directly opposed to the one drawn earlier using the plete set of qualification exercises are completed
short run techniques! Conclusion: Even though the with less than the desired result.
Q-Q and KS results suggested that we combine the data, With regard to the miss distance evaluation, fur-
this combination ther study needs to be done to determine if this
" increased variability of the whole sample by introduc- measure can be put in control for each ship. It ising between-ship variability; suspected that gun system alignment is the likely
reason for large miss distances. Evaluation of sys-
* widened the control limits; tem alignment and work done on the systems for
* weakened the test for control. the three ships involved must be evaluated in order
to address this issue, as well as evaluating data
from more ships. If gun system alignment is the
o reason for poor performance, the control chart pro-
•l vided an early warning of a system requiring align-
0) ment. This reason is compelling from evaluation of
the collected data since the large miss distances
C /. seems to be associated with only one of the two
C* mounts on ship 3, indicating that the gun mount is
" °out of alignment. Summarizing, we believe that
E the following action items are indicated:
0 A fleetwide cycle time specification can be
established, and each crew arriving at the range
5 10 15 20 should be able to meet the specification while
maintaining statistical control. This can be done
in a simulated environment before any liveFigure 5: R chart for all of the ships' cycle times. ammunition is expended.
e If the crew cannot meet the cycle time specifica-
tion while maintaining control, they should not
IMPLEMENTATION be allowed to shoot for qualification until caus-
es are identified and rectified.
The control charts that have been constructed are
useful for the individual ship to use as a gauge of 9 Each ship should maintain its own miss distance
real time performance, and for the team at the control limit, and ship's systems should be eval-
AFWTF exercise observation post. The initial use uated with respect to this control limit during
of the control chart for cycle time gives the ship a exercises.
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" Decision-makers responsible for preparing war agreed that our novel application of SPC method-
plans should be cognizant of ship capabilities ology was promising. These methods are being
and should not plan on gun systems to perform considered for implementation at AFWTF during
at levels exceeding these limits. qualification exercises in the very near future. It is
" The Range Control Officer (RCO) should main- our expectation that SPC will soon be implement-
tain the data on each ships' capabilities and ed in combat operational procedures in the future.
should publish these results Department-wide As per the above recommendations, the QMB also
for each exercise and for each platform. These agreed that studies of SPC should be pursued in
data would be extremely valuable to decision other defensive warfare applications.
makers working on any component of naval [1] American National Standard: Control Charting
gun weapon systems. Methodologies 1990. Milwaukee: American
* The RCO should be provided with technical Society for Quality Control.
expertise and software to support their real-time
collection and dissemination of control chart [2] Bothe, D. R. 1988. SPC for Short Production
data, and should be given authority to suspend Runs. Prepared for the U. S. Army Munitions
exercises or dismiss platforms which are discov- and Chemical Command, Product Assurance
ered to be out-of-control in mid-exercise. A Directorate, Process Control Engineering
ship would then start a search for attributable Division, Rock Island, Illinois.
causes for their out-of-control performance.
Exercises would resume once the causes were [3] Buffa, E. S. and R. K. Sarin. 1987. Modem
identified and rectified. Production/Operations Management. New York:
" Commanders and decision-makers should be John Wiley.
educated on the shortcomings and benefits of
employing control charting in NGFS processes. [4] Chambers, J. M., W. S. Cleveland, B. Kleiner,
and P. A. Tukey. 1983. Graphical Methods for
" Ship's commanders should be prepared to take Data Analysis. Pacific Grove, California:
their platforms off of the gun line if they discov- Wadsworth \& Brooks/Cole.
er that they are out of control during live mis-
sions. [5] Handbook of Industrial Engineering. 1982. G.
" NGFS readiness of the fleet must be measured Solvendy, ed. New York: John Wiley.
in terms of the number of ships able to maintain
statistical control in accuracy and gun cycle [6] Lewis, P. A. W., and E. J. Orav. 1989.
time. Simulation Methodology for Statisticians, Opera-
tions Analysts, and Engineers. Pacific Grove,
We believe that the financial investment made California: Wadsworth \& Brooks/Cole.
in ammunition, in NGFS protected assets, and at
AFWTF justify the above. We further believe that [7] Mazanec, W. A. 1992. Interactive Naval Gunfire
other protective missions such as electronic coun- Support Training, Masters Thesis, Department
termeasures, antiradiation missiles, convoy anti- of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate
submarine screening missions, preemptive special School, Monterey, California.
operations, and antiship missile defenses should be
evaluated in ways similar to the NGFS mission. [8] MIN1TAB Statistical Software Reference Manual.
1991. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Scientific Software.
EPILOGUE [9] Monks, J. G. 1987. Operations Management.
New York: McGraw Hill.
The OPNAV combat systems quality management
board (QMB) was briefed on our methodology in
May, 1993. COMNAVSURFLANT and AFWTF
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